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A currency attack fails on its own when the speculator suffers from her financial 
problem.  This paper extends the existing models and argues that the monetary 
authority’s willingness to peg and the speculator’s cost of attack are private 
information.  Our model thus accounts for the duration of currency attack/defense, 
and more importantly, allows for failed attack.  We employ an asymmetric war of 
attrition and gauge the time when the speculator stops attacking, or when the 
monetary authority de-pegs.  Comparative static results throw light on the interest rate 





KEYWORDS  Asymmetric war of attrition; Credibility of policymakers; Failed 
speculative attack; Persistent effect; Two-sided private information  
 





This paper is a substantially revised version of Chan, Sin and Cheng (2002a).  We are 
grateful to Kim-Sau Chung for his insightful criticism on the first draft, and to Ivan 
Pastine for his detailed comments.  Thanks also go to participants at the 2002 North 
American Econometric Society Summer Meeting.  Needless to say, all remaining 
errors are ours. 
 
* Corresponding author: Chor-yiu SIN, Department of Economics, Hong Kong Baptist 
University, Renfrew Road, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong.  Tel: +852-3411-
5200; Fax: +852-3411-5580; Email: cysin@hkbu.edu.hk. 
 
 




Since the seminal papers Salent and Henderson (1978) and Krugman (1979), a 
vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, has been devoted to studying the causes 
of currency crises.  The main theme of this type of balance of payments crises models 
is clear: An economy is vulnerable to currency attack when there is conflict between 
maintaining the fixed rate and other economic policy objectives such as a low 
unemployment rate and a steady growth. The fixed exchange rate system ends when 
the macroeconomic imbalance exceeds some thresholds such as a minimum level of 
reserves.  On the other hand, introducing some private information on the monetary 
authority’s type or some exogenous shock, Obstfeld (1986, 1996) formalizes the 
unpredictability of the timing of currency attack.  In this type of self-fulfilling 
currency attack models, the occurrence of a speculative attack depends on the 
coordination on the particular regime of expectation. 
 
Nevertheless, both types of models are silent about the duration of currency 
attack/peg and preclude the existence of failed currency attacks.  In reality, there 
exists a range of duration in defending the system.  The Bank of England exited the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) on September 16, 1992, only a day after an 
unsuccessful defense by raising the interest rate (Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti, 1998).  
In contrast, the Bank of Thailand devalued the baht on July 2, 1997, long after the 
speculative attack began in 1996 (Corbett and Vines, 1999). 
 
At times a monetary authority can even successfully defend its peg. 
1  The 
Hong Kong linked exchange rate system is one of the prominent examples, as it has 
survived several major attacks since its inception in October 1983.  From 1984 to 
1988, contrast to the familiar cases, Hong Kong dollar was speculated to revalue for 
at least four times (Law, 1989).  In 1988, the Hong Kong government even threatened 
to impose “negative interest rate” to deter the mass inflow of capital. 
2  Contrarily, 
                                                           
1 A detailed anecdotal account of successful and failed attacks can be found in Kraay (2003).  
2 Basically, people who deposited a large amount of Hong Kong dollar in the local banks, rather than 
receiving interest payment, would pay a fee.  The proposed policy is similar to the scheme   3
amidst the Asian Financial Crisis, the direction of attack was reversed.  The Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority raised the interest rate drastically on October 20, 1997 and 
the Hong Kong government even intervened more than one time in the local stock and 
futures markets in August 1998 to defend the link (Jao, 2001).  Interesting enough, the 
link is still intact at this moment, at a cost of deflation and sluggish economic growth 
though.  
 
Sweden is another interesting case often cited.  The Riksbank raised the 
interest rate several times from August to September in 1992.  The speculator left the 
market momentarily.  However, this successful defense did not last and the 
speculative pressure came back in mid November.  This time the Riksbank forwent 
the peg on November 19 (Drazen, 2000).  This case also illustrates that a monetary 
authority may weigh the benefits and costs of the peg differently, should the 
economic fundamentals change (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). 
 
Apart from the above cases, the currency attack in United States during the 
period 1894-1896, that in United Kingdom in 1956, that in Mexico in 1995, and that 
in South Korea in 1997, also failed.  See Grilli (1990) and Boughton (2001) for 
detailed discussions.  Nevertheless, those failures are due to the unexpected 
3  
borrowing from IMF or some other source, while there existed no such borrowing in 
cases discussed above.  On the other hand, Broner (2002) allows for failed “probing” 
attack in a model where speculators “coordinate”.  While the coordination among 
speculators is an important issue, 
4  once again Broner (2002) considers a balance of 
payments crisis and it is our opinion that apart from the amount of reserves, objectives 
other than currency stability should also be considered.  
 
This paper extends the existing models of currency attack to explain both the 
range of duration of attack/defense and the possibility of failed attack.  We argue that 
the duration of currency attack/defense depends not only on the economic 
fundamentals such as high interest rate or the magnitude of devaluation, but also on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
implemented in Switzerland in the 1970s (Greenwood, 1989).  At the end the Hong Kong government 
shelved the plan, as the US dollar appreciated against other major currencies at the end of 1988. 
3 If there are expected borrowing which can successfully defend the currency, the speculator would not 
have been started an attack.  See also our model in Section 3.    4
the two-sided private information kept by the two parties: (1) the (monetary) 
authority, (2) the speculator.  First, we follow the lines in Obstfeld (1996) and assume 
the authority faces a trade-off between different targets such as output growth and 
currency/price stability; and this information is kept private.  Norman Lamont, the 
British ex-Chancellors of the Exchequer in-charging of exchange rate policy during 
the 1992 ERM crisis, said in his autobiography: 
 
“There has been much speculation about my own attitude to the ERM, 
enlivened by myths such as the story that I sang in my bath on 16 September when we 
finally ended our membership of it.  As has been stated, I accepted the policy when I 
became Chancellor.  It was not my preferred policy, but I had no reason to think it 
would become unworkable.” (p.208, Lamont, 1999) 
 
On the other hand, we assume the cost of attack, which includes not only the 
interest cost but also the speculator’s other opportunities to invest, is a piece of 
information private to the speculator.  Eichengreen and Mathieson in an IMF study 
have the following finding: 
 
“…… it has been suggested, hedge funds precipitated major movements in 
asset prices, either through the sheer volume of their own transactions or via the 
tendency of other market participants to follow their lead.  Yet for all this attention, 
little concrete information is available about the extent of hedge funds’ activities.” 
(p.2, Eichengreen and Mathieson, 1998)   
 
This paper starts with a brief literature review in the next section.  The 
theoretical model can be found in Section 3.  In Section 4, we impose some additional 
assumptions that render an analytical solution.  To the best of our knowledge, this is 
new under the topic of asymmetric  war of attrition.  The dynamic equilibrium is 
unique and thus contrasts with the self-fulfilling currency attack models, which are 
often built on multiple equilibria.  The comparative static results of this formulation 
are also derived.  Policy implications with special attention to the 1992-93 ERM crisis 
and the 1997-98 Asian Currency Crisis are presented.  The persistent effect and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 We will come back to this point in Section 5.    5
credibility of policymakers, in the context of interest rate policy, will be discussed.  
We conclude in Section 5.  All technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.   




2. A brief literature review 
 
As one can see in Sections 3 and 4 below, our model is a variant of war of 
attrition with private information in both players.  Based on the game-theoretical 
work developed in Riley (1980) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), this type of models 
has been applied to many economic issues.  They include the exit time of a duopolist 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986) and the delay in stabilization (Alesina and Drazen, 
1991).  As in all these applications, each player joins the “war” with the hope that she 
is facing a weak opponent.  As time passes, only strong players remain.  Each 
antagonistic player decides the exit time when the (expected) marginal cost of staying 
on equals the (expected) marginal gain, given the fact that the longer the opponent 
stays in the game, the stronger the opponent is.  In our context, the monetary authority 
determines the time to de-peg and the speculator determines the time to stop from 
attacking. 
5  Allsopp (2000) also uses a war of attrition to explain the duration of 
currency crisis.  The players in her model are two governments (“Germany” and 
“United Kingdom” in the 1992-93 ERM crisis), which are treated symmetrically.  The 
governments bargain over the changes in their domestic policy after the attack on 
their peg.  While her model is related to the center-periphery model of monetary 
coordination (see, for instance, Buiter et al., 1998), it does not allow for any failed 
attack.   
 
As far as private information is concerned, our model goes one step beyond 
the self-fulfilling currency attack models.  We do not simply incorporate the monetary 
authority’s evaluation of cost and benefit of the peg but also the speculators’ 
                                                           
5 For only technical reasons, throughout the paper, we assume that the monetary authority determines 
to de-peg and that the speculator determines to stop from attacking at some finite point of time, should 
their counter party stays on.    6
evaluation of her cost and benefit to attack. 
6  The latter assumption is justified on the 
ground that people (including those in the monetary authority) in general do not have 
much information about the speculator’s credit line as well as her potential investment 
opportunities (see Bensaid and Jeanne, 1997).
7  In other words, while the monetary 
authority signals its willingness to peg, the speculator signals her willingness to 
attack.  As a result, depending on their relative willingness, it may not be the case that 
the monetary authority finally concedes and thus our model allows for failed attack.  
Our result contrasts with those in a recent paper Pastine (2002), in which the 
monetary authority (and only the monetary authority) introduces uncertainty into the 
speculator’s decision by playing a mixed strategy.  Moreover, while our paper was 
inspired by the ideas in Drazen (2000) which models the time-to-time attack/peg, 
introducing two-sided private information in our model dispenses with the 
unspecified exogenous shock, as well as the depletion of reserves.  
 
This paper also contrasts with the existing literature on time of devaluation.  
While Flood and Marion (1997) and Klein and Marion (1997) ignore any currency 
attack or simply assumes a capital control, this paper also concerns the duration of 
attack.  On the other hand, although Bensaid and Jeanne (1997), Ozkan and 
Sutherland (1998), and Drazen (2000) discuss, among many other things, the duration 
of attack, they only considered one-sided (the authority’s) private information and/or 
some exogenous shock.  For instance, some of the conclusions in Bensaid and Jeanne 
(1997) hinge on the arrival of good news or rising interest rate (p.1475).   Interesting 
enough, they also note, “The currency crisis can stop by itself if for example 
speculators are financially exhausted” (p.1474).  In a sense, our model endogenizes 
the speculator’s time to terminate the attack under the assumption of her financial 
situation being a piece of private information.  
 
 
3. Currency attack/defense as an asymmetric war of attrition 
                                                           
6  To avoid confusion, throughout, we use an “it” for the monetary authority, and a “she” for the 
representative speculator. 
7  After the Asian financial crisis, many Asian monetary authorities urged more disclosures of the 
private financial institutions’ activities in the international capital markets.  See, for instance, Yam 
(1999).   7
 
In this section, we consider a continuous time model in which time is denoted 
as  t, where t  ≥ 0 .  There are two players: One is the representative speculator 
(henceforth speculator) (S) while the other is the monetary authority (henceforth the 
authority) (A).  At the beginning of the game when t = 0, the speculator starts a 
currency attack while the authority defends.  At each instant t > 0 the speculator 
decides whether she continues to attack or stays out of the foreign exchange market.  
Similarly, the authority decides whether it continues to defend or lets the currency 
float (or manages the currency float). 
8 
 
The speculator bears a constant flow of cost cS if she stays on.  This cost may 
include but does not confine to the interest cost of short selling.  Similarly, the 
authority bears some economic and/or social costs in defending the peg (which may 
or may not be due to high interest rate), which is denoted as cA.  On the other hand, if 
the speculator terminates the attack before the authority de-pegs, the authority’s gain 
will be πA while by normalization, the payoff of the speculator is 0.  Note that while 
cA is interpreted as the economic and/or social cost of defending the peg, πA is 
interpreted as the economic and/or social benefit of currency stability when there is 
no attack. Similarly, if the authority forgoes the peg first, the speculator’s gain from 
devaluation will be πS while the payoff of the authority is 0.   
 
The speculator chooses the “exit” time tS  while the authority chooses the 
“exit” time tA, to maximize the expected net present value with a discount rate ρ.  The 
payoff for each player differs in different scenarios. 
 
Scenario I: The speculator stops attacking first 
 
If the speculator stops attacking the currency at time tS (while the authority 





-ρtdt =  -
ρ
ρ ) (
S t e 1
− −
cS.                                                           (1)  
                                                           
8 This implies that once the speculator terminates the attack, and/or the authority de-pegs, a new game   8
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Scenario II: The authority stops defending first 
 
In a similar token, if the authority de-pegs at time tA (while the speculator 








S π  e
-ρtdt  = 
ρ





.                              (3) 
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ρ
ρ ) (
A t e 1
− −
cA.                                                           (4)  
 
As argued in the previous sections, while cS (the cost of speculation) is the 
speculator’s private information, πA (the benefit of currency stability) is the 
authority’s private information.  The authority has a prior belief about 1/cS (the 
reciprocal of cS), which is represented by a density function fS(.) defined on a support 
[1/ S c , ∞).   S c  > 0 is the cost which is high enough such that the speculator does not 
attack.  See Assumption (2) below.  Similarly, the speculator has a belief about πA, 
which is represented by a density function fA(.) defined on a support [ A π , ∞), where 
we assume  A π  > 0. 
 
The speculator’s strategy is represented by an optimal time function TS: [1/ S c , 
∞) → [0, ∞), which states that for each possible value of 1/cS, the time when the 
speculator stops from attacking (while the authority maintains the peg).  Similarly, the 
authority’s strategy can be represented by another optimal time function TA: [ A π , ∞) 
→ [0, ∞), which states that for each possible value of πA, the time when the authority 
                                                                                                                                                                      
starts.   9
de-pegs (while the speculator keeps attacking). 
9                       
 
Formulating the speculator’s objective function 
 
Consider the speculator’s problem first.  Recall that the authority’s strategy is 
denoted as TA(.), that the speculator’s type is characterized by the reciprocal of its 
cost 1/cS, and tS is the time when the speculator plans to stop attacking.  The objective 
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]fA(x)dx.                (5)  
 
Note that in the above expression, the first term is the speculator’s expected 
payoff if the authority defends the currency until or beyond tS; whereas the second 
term is the speculator’s expected payoff if the authority abandons the peg before tS.  
 
Formulating the authority’s objective function 
 
Similarly the objective function of the authority is: 
VA(tA, TS(.), πA) = ProbS(x|TS(x)≥ tA) [- 
ρ
ρ ) (
A t e 1
− −
cA] 
                                   +  ∫
< } ) ( | { A S t x T x
[
ρ









Now we are able to define the equilibrium of the model.  
 
                                                           
9 For only technical reasons, we assume that both 1/cS and πA are unbounded above, which contrasts 
with that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).  On the other hand, we consider cases in which the optimal tS 
and tA are finite.  (See the illustrative case in Section 4.)  That merely precludes the unlikely case in 






















and      VA(TA(πA), TS(.), πA) ≥ VA(t, TS(.), πA).                                                    
 
The following assumptions hold throughout the rest of the paper. 
 




and ( A π , ∞) respectively.                                                                                   
Assumption (2): 0 < ρ < 1.  TS(
S c
1
) = 0 and TA(πA) = T  for all πA ≥  A π ∈ [ A π , ∞).  
Each of ρ, T and  A π  is a piece of common knowledge.                                    
 
Assumption (1) is auxiliary and it allows the first order conditions of VS(tS, 
TA(.),  1/cS) and VA(tA,  TS(.),  πA) to exist.  Assumption (2) specifies the boundary 
conditions for solving the differential equations, as one will see in Lemmas 1 and 2.  
Economically speaking, if the cost of attacking (cS) is too high, the speculator would 
have stayed out of the market at the outset, and thus the optimal tS is 0.  On the other 
hand, there exists a time T such that even for an authority at the high end (of gain 
from currency stability), it will de-peg at T .  As a result, one may interpret T  as the 
time when the authority runs out of reserves. 
 
To aptly characterize the equilibrium, we need a lemma that resembles Lemma 
(1) in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). 
 
Lemma 1: Consider a BNE [TS(1/cS), TA(πA)].  Suppose in addition to Assumptions (1) 
and (2), TS(.) and TA(.) are strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on 
(1/ S c , ∞) and ( A π , ∞) respectively.  Then:    11
(a) For i = S, A, there exists an inverse function Γi(t) such that Ti[Γi(t)] = t.  ΓS(t) and 
ΓA(t) are also strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on (0,
) , (
sup
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(b) For t ∈ (0 ∨
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The inverse functions Γi(.)’s in Lemma 1, as one can see in the proof (and the 
proofs of other propositions), much facilitate our discussion.  The main thrust of 
Lemma 1 is the necessary first order conditions in Equations (7) and (8).  Equation (7) 
can be interpreted as follows.  The cost of continuing to attack between t and (t+dt) is 
e
-ρtcSdt.  On the other hand, at time t, the (conditional) probability that the authority 










t d A ) ( Γ
dt and should it de-pegs, the 
speculator’s gain is e
-ρtπS/ρ.  Equating the marginal cost with the expected marginal 
gain, canceling out e
-ρt and dt, and replacing 1/cS by ΓS(t), Equation (7) results.  A 
similar interpretation can be applied to Equation (8).  See the proof of Lemma 1 for 
details.  
 
From Equations (7) and (8), it is easy to see that 
dt
t d S ) ( Γ
> 0 and 
dt
t d A ) ( Γ
> 0; 
and by Part (a) of the same lemma, 
) / 1 (












> 0.  That is, the 
smaller the cS is, the longer the speculator stays.  On the other hand, the larger the πA 
is, the longer the authority stays.  
 
   12
4. Bayesian Nash equilibrium and interest rate policy 
 
In this section, we characterize the BNE along the lines in Lemma 1.  Instead 
of arguing the validity of the general assumptions imposed in Lemma 1, we specify 
an exact distribution and solve out the necessary first order conditions (7) and (8) in 
closed-form.  The optimal time functions are then obtained.  We proceed to verify the 
second order conditions and argue that [TS(1/cS), TA(πA)] is a BNE.  The exact 












A π ) is an exponential density with parameter 
A m
1
.                                          
 
The exponential distribution is widely used in many papers on war of attrition, 
due to the fact that there is no general analytical solution to the differential equations 
in Lemma 1, should another distribution be used.  See, for instance, Riley (1980) 
which makes a similar claim.  The following lemma characterizes the BNE under the 
above specification. 
 
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption (1*) and Assumption (2) hold.  For t ∈ (0, T ), the 
BNE is characterized by the following two differential equations: 
  
dt








,                                                                                     (9) 
and       
dt








.                                                                                    (10) 
The boundary conditions are ΓS(0) = (1/ S c ) and ΓA(T ) =  A π .                                                                    
 













, which is a constant.  This property allows us to solve for [ΓS(t), 
ΓA(t)] analytically.  For i = S, A, the mean (of 1/cS or πA) is mi while the variance is   13
2
i m .  Unlike many examples of war of attrition (see, for instance, Alesina and Drazen, 
1991, and Riley, 1980), ours can hardly be symmetric.  This is because economic 
fundamentals, which govern mS,  πS,  cA,  mA and other parameters, have different 
impacts on the speculator and the authority.  To the best of our knowledge, this 
particular asymmetric war of attrition has not been solved out analytically.  Further, 
as one can see in Propositions 4 and 5, we obtain some interesting comparative static 
results. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose Assumption (1*) and Assumption (2) hold.  For t ∈ [0, T ],  
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on the other hand, 
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S c  ∨  A π ,  A π ],                        (14) 
where P ≡ (mA/πS +  cAmS), R ≡ (mA/πS)/(cAmS).  k > 0 is implicitly defined in the 
equation: 





).                                              (15)   
                                                                                                                               
From a policymaker’s point of view, once the currency attack starts, it is 
beneficial to shorten the duration.  In virtue of the explicit time function TS(.), the 
policymaker may want to alter the parameters such that TS(.) is smaller.  To meet this 
end, we consider the partial derivatives of TS(.) with respect to the parameters.  For 
completeness, we also derive those of TA(.).  Results are reported in the following two 
propositions.  
 
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumption (1*) and Assumption (2) hold.  Denote P1 ≡ 
mA/πS, P2 ≡ cAmS.  For all 1/cS ∈ (1/ S c , ∞) and for all πA ∈ (k
S c ∨  A π ,  A π ),    14
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Interpreting T  as the time when the authority runs out of reserves, Part (a) of 
the above proposition is consistent with the results implied by the balance of 
payments crises.  That is, the larger the T  is, the longer the duration of defense is, 
and the shorter the duration of attack is.  In other words, our model with two-sided 
private information also suggests that a healthy balance of payments results in a more 
credible fixed exchange rate.  See the illustration in Figure 1. 
10 
 
Figure 1 is here 
 
On the other hand, a larger  A π  means more likely the authority de-pegs before 
T .  In other words, more likely the authority prefers things (such as output growth or 
low unemployment) other than stable exchange rate (and/or stable domestic price).  
We say that the authority is “weaker” in defending the peg.  Part (b)(i) shows that the 
“weaker” the authority is, the sooner it de-pegs.  On the other hand, Part (b)(ii) shows 
that the “weaker” the authority is, the longer the speculator keeps attacking.  
 
In a similar token, a larger  S c  means more likely the speculator faces a higher 
constant flow of cost cS.  In other words, the authority will have a higher probability to 
face a “weaker” opponent and would like to stay longer.  Also, the existing speculator 
signals her “strength” by staying longer.  (i) and (ii) of Part (c) confirm these 
assertions. 
 
It is not straightforward to determine the signs of the terms in Parts (d) and (e). 
That said, succinct investigation on the original expressions for TS(1/cS) and TA(πA) 
tells us the impacts of changes in the parameter P1 or P2.  The results are reported in 
the following proposition, and they are illustrated in Figures 2 – 5(a)(b). 
11 
 
  For brevity of notation, for any function g(x),  g(x
+) denotes the right-hand 
limit; while g(∞) denotes the limit of g(x) when x → ∞. 
 
                                                           
10 The actual figures used in this illustration are available upon request to the corresponding author.    16
Proposition 5: Suppose Assumption (1*) and Assumption (2) hold.  Recall that P1 = 
mA/πS and P2 = cAmS.  
(a)  (i) If 
1
1 P  > 
0
1 P , 
1
A T (πA) > 
0
A T (πA), for all πA ∈ (k
S c ∨  A π ,  A π ).  
      (ii) If 
1
1 P  > 
0








1 +) and 
1
S T (∞) > 
0
S T (∞). 
(b)  (i) If 
1
2 P  > 
0
2 P , 
1
A T (πA) < 
0
A T (πA), for all πA ∈ (k
S c ∨  A π ,  A π ). 
      (ii) If 
1
2 P > 
0


















1 +) and 
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1 +) and 
1
S T (∞) < 
0
S T (∞).   
 
Figures 2 - 5(a)(b) are here 
 
Refer to the celebrated analysis in Drazen and Masson (1994).  In our context, 
the “credibility of policymakers” shortens the duration of attack while the “persistent” 
effect prolongs the durations of attack.  Take cA as an example.  When cA increases 
and so does P2, by Part (b) of the above proposition, the duration of attack will be 
shortened or prolonged, depending on (i) k/P2 increases or decreases; and if k/P2 
increases, (ii) 1/cS is small or large, a piece of information unknown to the authority.  
In other words, even with the concrete specification in Assumption (1*), it is unclear 
if the “credibility of policymakers” dominates the “persistent effect” or the other way 
round.   
 
We close this section with a discussion on the impacts of interest rate policy 
on the duration of attack.  It should be clear from our discussion below that, unlike 
many papers on war of attrition, the asymmetry is not only closer to the reality, but 
also results in interesting implications of interest rate policy. 
 
The above proposition sheds light on the on-going debate about the 
appropriate interest rate policy during the 1997-98 Asian Currency Crisis.   
Apparently, the crisis-inflicted Asian economies, such as the ASEAN-4 all 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 See Footnote 10.   17
experienced a prolonged duration of several weeks of attacks before they finally 
announced the de-peg of their currencies.  In contrast, Hong Kong won the game of 
defending its currency.  This has led analysts to argue that the loose monetary policy 
of the Asian countries in the early stage of crisis has worsened the situation (see, 
among others, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999).  It is also consistent with the 
long-holding stance of the IMF, whose rescue programs always include a high interest 
rate policy.  Critics of such policy advice often point to its adverse effects, especially 
in exacerbating the widespread bankruptcies of banks and corporations, leading to a 
credit crunch that causes more bankruptcies.  Our model adds on the debate by 
considering how the interest rate tool, which acts as an exogenous parameter in our 
model, affects the equilibrium.  Whether to raise the interest rate is a hard choice 
because it hurts not only the speculator but also the domestic economy.  As shown in 
Proposition 5, the net effect of an increase in interest rate (and thus an increase in cA 
but a decrease in mS) on the duration of attack may be positive or negative.  A high 
interest rate policy is thus unwarranted in these cases.   
 
This of course does not preclude the possibility that some interest rate policy, 
such as a one-shot sharp increase in interest rate, is an effective policy.  Inspired by 
the work Lahiri and Végh (2003), Chan, Sin and Cheng (2002b) provides an analysis, 
with special reference to Hong Kong amidst the Asian Currency Crisis. 
 
 
5. Concluding comments 
 
A currency attack terminates on its own when the speculator has problems in 
her financial position.  In this paper, we extend the existing models of currency attack 
to cases with two-sided private information.  It is argued that not only the monetary 
authority’s willingness to peg is private information, so is the cost of attack of the 
speculator.  In so doing, we develop a theoretical model that accounts for the duration 
of currency attack/defense, and more importantly, that allows for failed currency 
attack.  We employ an asymmetric war of attrition and gauge the time when the 
speculator stops attacking (if she fails) and the time when the monetary authority de-
pegs (if it concedes).  We derive some comparative static results and thus throw light   18
on the possible interest rate policy in defending against currency attack.  Special 
attention is given to the 1992-93 Exchange Rate Mechanism crises and the 1997-98 
Asian currency crises.  
 
The model in this paper is a variant of war of attrition.  Unlike many 
applications in economics, we consider an asymmetric case that is more appropriate in 
our context.  The exact Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the comparative static results 
are derived under the assumption of an exponential distribution.  As in other 
applications, our equilibrium is subgame perfect.   
 
This paper considers one single representative speculator.  However, in reality 
there is generally more than one speculator.  Intuitively, the duration of currency 
attack as well as the failed speculative attack can still be explained once we consider 
the authority and the speculators have private information on their own benefits and 
costs in exiting/continuing the defense/attacks in the war of attrition.  If the monetary 
authority is relatively “strong”, all speculators may concede first and failed currency 
attack results.  However, there may be multiple equilibria as a speculator’s strategy to 
exit/continue depends on the other speculators’ actions.  This is similar to the self-
fulfilling currency attack models in which a speculator’s decision to attack depends 
on other speculators’ actions.  As there are diverse beliefs among the speculators, 
regardless of one-sided or two-sided private information, the strategic interaction and 
coordination among the speculators become important (Botman and Jager, 2002, 
Broner, 2002, Chamley, 2003, and Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin, 2000).  The 
characterization of the equilibrium/equilibria will thus be complex.  We leave this 
challenging topic to other research.  
 
 
Appendix: Technical Proofs 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
 
(a) is obvious from the assumptions and thus the proof is omitted.  For (b), we first 
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For the authority’s problem, similarly, we can differentiate VA(t,  ΓS(.),  πA) with 
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However, we cannot obtain ΓS(t) and ΓA(t) by simply solving Equations (A.4) and 
(A.5).  It is because the authority (or the speculator), as well as other investigators of 
the entire game, at most acquires the information on ΓS(t) (or ΓA(t)) rather than that on 
1/cS  (or πA).  In view of this, we replace 1/cS and πA with ΓS(t) and ΓA(t) respectively.  
Equations (7) and (8) result.                          
 
Proof of Lemma 2:   20




















The proofs for both equalities are similar.  As no ambiguity arises, we suppress the 






(x-x)], where x ∈ [x, ∞).  
It is not difficult to show that: 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
Rearranging Equations (9) and (10) in Lemma 2,  
  ΓA(t)dΓS(t) = (ρcAmS)dt.                                                                      (A.6) 




mA)dt.                                                                   (A.7) 
Using integration by parts, (A.6) yields 
  ΓA(t)ΓS(t) - ∫ΓS(t)dΓA(t) =(ρcAmS)t + k1, where k1 is a constant.         (A.8) 




mA)t + k2, where k2 is a constant.                  (A.9) 
Adding (A.8) to (A.9) yields 
  ΓA(t)ΓS(t) = ρPt + k,                                                                             
in which k = k1 +k2 and we recall that P = (mA/πS + cAmS).  As πA > 0 and 1/cS > 0, k 
= ΓA(0)ΓS(0) > 0.  Re-write the above equation: 
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     ⇒  (1+R) lnΓS(t) = ln(ρPt +k)+ h, where h is a constant.                                                           
 
Solving, ΓS(t) = [exp(h)]
1/(1+R)[ρRt+k]
1/(1+R).                                                 (A.11) 
Put (A.11) into (A.10).  Solving, 
     ΓA(t) = [exp(h)]
-1/(1+R)[ρRt+k]
R/(1+R);                                                         (A.12) 
 
And the boundary conditions are given by:  





),                                                            (A.13) 
                     and  h = -ln k -(1+R)ln S c .                                                        (A.14) 
 
However, by (A.14), 
exp(h) = 
1 k
− ) ( R 1
S c
+ − .                                                                          (A.15) 
 
Putting (A.15) into (A.11)-(A.12), it follows that: 
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and equivalently, 
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Finally, by (A.16)-(A.17), in view of the fact that 
dt
t d S ) ( Γ
> 0 and 
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> 0, it is 
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< 0.  In other words, the 
second order conditions are also satisfied.  The proof is thus complete.    
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Proof of Proposition 4: 
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Thus Part (a) is proved.  
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Thus Part (b) is also proved. 
 
On the other hand, by (15)  
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By (A.25) and (A.29), Part (c) is also proved.   
 
On the other hand, with ∆ > 0 lies between k and k T P + ρ , by (A.13), tedious algebra 
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This completes the proof.    
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
For any function g(x), denote its derivative as 
' g (x).  Re-write (A.27) as: 
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First consider P1.  By (A.30), when P1 increases, k and thus k S c  decreases.  Thus by 
(14), TA(πA) cuts the x-axis at a smaller value (or it cuts the minimal y at the same 
value if the original k S c  is smaller than  A π ).  On the other hand, by (A.36) and 
(A.30), an increase in P1 will result in a decrease in 
'
A T  (πA).  All in all, TA(πA) shifts 
upwards.  (See Figure 2 for an illustration.)  Thus (a)(i) is proved. 
 
Next consider P2.  By (A.31), when P2 increases, k and thus k S c  increases.  Thus by 
(14), TA(πA) cuts the x-axis at a larger value (or it cuts the minimal y at the same value 
if the new  k S c  is still smaller than  A π ).  On the other hand, by (A.37) and (A.31), an 
increase in P2  will result in an increase in 
'
A T  (πA).  All in all, TA(πA) shifts 
downwards.  (See Figure 4 for an illustration.)  Thus (b)(i) is proved. 
 
On the other hand, from (A.18) above:                                                                               
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First consider P1.  By (A.30), when P1 increases, k decreases.  On the other hand, R 














→  ∞, 
'
S T  (
S c
1
) increases.  (See Figure 3 for  an  illustration.)   
Thus (a)(ii) is proved. 
 
Next consider P2.  By (A.31), when P2 increases, k increases.  On the other hand, R 
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) decreases.  (See Figure 5(a) 
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